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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JEANNETTE U. SWAN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

vs.
Case No. 14823
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB,
and DR. DENNIS D. THOEN,
Defendants and
Respondents.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS APPLICATION
OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE PREJUDICIALLY
AFFECTED PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO PROPERLY
QUALIFY HER EXPERT WITNESS.
Both defendants admit in their briefs that
the trial court disallowed testimony from plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Peter M. Rocovich,

because he had no

"personal contact or experience within the state of
Utah."

Tr. day 3 at 118; 4 at 6-7; Brief for Respon-

dent Dr. Thoen at 15, 40; Brief for Respondent Dr.
Lamb at 8.

It thus appears uncontested that the trial

court applied what plaintiff has characterized as the
"strict" rather than the "similar" locality rule.

Dr.

Lamb, however, unlike Dr. Thoen, argues that, for purposes of this case, it is not important which of the
said "locality" rules was applied.

See Brief for
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Respondent Dr. Lamb at 11; Brief for Respondent Dr.
Thoen at 19-34, 37.

Dr. Lamb's position in this

respect is erroneous.
For an expert witness to be permitted to
testify when the "strict locality" is applied, he
must show knowledge and familiarity with the relevant
methods and customs of medical practice within a
specific geographic locality.

According to the rule,

said knowledge and familiarity must have been acquired
through personal contact and experience with that
locality and its physicians.

On the other hand, under

the "similar locality rule," such a witness need only
show knowledge and familiarity with the relevant methods
and customs of medical practice in localities of similu
makeup to the area in question.

There is no need to

demonstrate first-hand acquaintance with the area itself·
Clearly where an expert witness claims familiarity
with the standard of care in a locality, not on the basis
of his first-hand contacts with that locality, but on
the basis of his contacts and experiences in and with
localities of a similar nature, the court selection of
either a "strict" or a "similarly" locality rules, will
make all the difference in the world in whether that
expert will be allowed to testify.
Dr. Thoen, agrees that had the trial court
allowed testimony as to the similarity of medical
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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factors in Los Angeles as compared to Salt Lake City,
Dr. Rocovich's testimony on the standard of care
may have been allowed.

See Brief for Respondent Dr.

Thoen at 37. Since evidence of similarites between
the two areas did not enter into the trial judge's consideration in making his ruling, it is obvious which
"locality" rule he applied, and that such application
was important to the outcome of the case.

The only

way in which the decision of that court can be affirmed
is by adoption in Utah of the "strict

locality rule."

POINT II
DEFENDANT DR. THOEN'S ARGUMENT FOR
EXISTING WIDE ACCEPTANCE AND APPLICATION
OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE FAILS TO
CONSIDER THE FULL RANGE OF COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS, IN THE JURISDICTIONS CITED,
WHICH SHOW THE CONTRARY.
Dr. Thoen argues that Utah has a long
tradition of following the strict locality rule and
claims that such a rule is "absolutely necessary" in
Utah.

See Brief for Respondent Dr. Thoen at 19, 23.

Interestingly, Dr. Lamb recognized no such "necessity."
In fact, Dr. Lamb appears to argue that the Utah standard
is and should be the "similar locality rule."
for Respondent Dr. Lamb at 10-19.

See Brief

Such confusion in

the perceptions and positions of the defendants is
supportive of plaintiff's argument, as stated in her
initial brief, that the law in Utah is neither clear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nor established.

Not until this appeal has the Utah

Supreme Court had to decide precisely what the Utah
Medical Standard of Care was.
Dr. Thoen undertakes to discredit plaintiff's
position that the strict locality has been adopted in
only a small minority of American jurisdictions, by
reporting the results of his "exhaustive study" of
U.S. medical standards which he claims show that no
less than 17 states presently apply the strict locality
rule in medical malpractice cases.

See Brief for

Respondent Dr. Thoen at 22 et seq.
Plaintiff examined some of the cases to which
Dr. Thoen referred and investigated the laws of some
of the jurisdictions cited.

Certain discrepancies came

to light in that investigation.

For instance, Coleman

v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975), is cited in support
of the proposition that Delaware uses a strict community
standard.

It is true that the footnote in Coleman from

which Dr. Thoen gleans his information reads as follows:
The settled rule in Delaware is that
a surgeon is bound to the same standar~s of
care and competence as other surgeons in
good standing ordinarily adhere to in the
community.
DeFilippo v. Preston, D~l.Supr.,
173 A.2d 333 (1961); Christian v. Wilmington
General Hospital Association, Del.Supr., 135
A.2d 727 (1957). Coleman, Supra at 10, n.2.
h

The DeFilippo case, however, cited int e
note, clarifies that "community" as used in Coleman,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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foot-

means "the same or a similar community:"
The general rule is that a surgeon is
bound to the same standards of care and
competence as other surgeons in good standing
ordinarily adhere to in the same or a similar
community.
41 Arn.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons,
§82; 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons, §43.
This general rule is also the law of Delaware.
Christian v. Wilmington General Hospital, 11
Terry 550, 134 A.2d 727; Mitcnell v. Atkins,
6 W.W. Harr.
451, 178 A. 593. See DeFilippo,
supra at 336.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Delaware standard would appear to be the "similar
locality rule" rather than the "strict locality rule"
as represented by Dr. Thoen.
Dr. Thoen also suggests that the Illinois standard
is the strict locality rule and cites Mann v. Sanders,
173 N.E.2d 12 (Ill.App. 1961).

However, in a later case,

a broader statement explaining the nature of such a
"locality" appeared:
[I] llinois . . . [follows] the "locality rule"
under which a defendant doctor is bound to
exercise such care and diligence as a good
practitioner practicing in a same or similar
community or hospital. Borowski v. VonSolberg,
14 Ill.App.3d 672, 303 N.E.2d 146 (1973).
(Emphasis added.)
Such language is not reflective of the existence of a
strict locality rule in Illinois.

(Note that the statement

is broad enough to cover general practitioners and
specialists alike.)
While it is not doubted that Dr. Thoen intended
to accurately represent to the Court the current status
nf the law in sister states, it appears that at least some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the cases cited do not contain information which is
complete enough to allow for a determination as to
standard of care really governed.

whi~

It can be supposed

that in others of the cases cited by Dr. Thoen, a proper
factual setting for a definitive pronouncement concerning
the standard of care to be applied might have been
lacking, thereby making any prouncement thereon merely
dicta.

(See Brief for Appellant Swan at 14-20 for a

discussion of this characteristic as concerns Utah.)
Plaintiff considers herself to have made no mistake
in stating that the strict locality rule is still
viable in only a small minority of American jurisdictions.
POINT III
ARGUMENTS MADE BY DR. LAMB CONCERNING
DR. ROCOVICH'S CREDENTIALS ARE NOT
MATTERS AFFECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF HIS TESTIMONY, BUT, RATHER, THE
WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN IT.
Defendant Dr. Lamb devotes a considerable
portion of his brief to the argument that because Dr.
Rocovich was not a board certified specialist he was
incompetent

to express an opinion concerning the

conduct of the defendants.

Dr. Lamb complains that:

Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case
where a doctor who is not board certified
in his own speciality has been allowed to
testify as to the standard of care.or
d
qualifications of a defendant who is boar
certified in a different specialty. The
situation is ludicrous on its face. We
submit that no such condition should ever
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be permitted to exist.
Dr. Lamb at 22.

Brief for Respondent

There are actually a number of cases which could
be cited to show that experts not only need not be board
certified but need not be specialists in order to explain
the standard of care applicable to specialists.

In Harris

v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1967), the testimony of
a general practitioner was allowed on the standard of
care of a Nebraska specialist in orthopedic surgery.

In

Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953),
an 82 year-old general practitioner who had been retired
for 20 years was held competent to testify as to the
standard of care for an orthopedic surgeon.

The witness

said he kept abreast of medical and surgical progress
through the reading of texts and medical journals.

Again

in Steinberg v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 364 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1966), a general practitioner testified for
the plaintiff as an expert witness in a case involving
alleged malpractice by a plastic surgery specialist.

For

additional references see comments and analysis in
Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1163 (1970); Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 275
(1972); 31 Arn.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence §§105-107
(1967).
The general rule in this regard is that a physician
or surgeon is not imcompetent to testify as an expert
though he is not a specialist in the particular branch
of medicine involved in the case.

See 31 Arn.Jur.2d
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Expert and Opinion Evidence §106

(1967).

If a physician who is duly licensed by the
proper authorities to engage in the general
practice of his profession says that, assuming
a hypothetical statement of facts to be true,
he can express an opinion satisfactory to
himself as to a question or science pertaini~
to a particular branch of medicine, he is n~
precluded from testifying as an expert simply
because he is not a technical specialist in
that particular department. Id.
Some states, such as California, go beyond a
mere licensure requirement and ask that a witness show
that he has "occupational experience" with the procedure
in question.

See Pearce v. Linde,113 Cal.App.2d 627,

248 P. 2d 506 (1952).

Other states, such as New Jersey,

require only that an expert show knowledge of and
familiarity with the procedure from private study,
observation or consultation.
11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680

See Carbone v. Warburton,

(1953).

Speciality certification

under either system is not at all determinitive of
admissibility of testimony but goes merely to the
weight to be attached to it.

See Baerman v. Reisinger,

124 D.C.App. 180, 363 F.2d 309 (1966); Hawkins v. Schof~,
204 S.2d 336 (Fla.App. 1967); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d
1163 (1970); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 275 (1972); 31
Expert and Opinion Evidence §106

(1967).

~

When Dr. Lamb,

in his brief, argues that Dr. Rocovich was unfit to
testify because he was not board certified and because
he had testified in other malpractice cases, he is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

mistaking matters which will affect the weight to be
given the doctor's testimony for matters which will
affect its admissibility.

Matters of weight are for

the jury.
The only reason for a court to require that
a plaintiff's expert be a specialist would be if the
medical procedures involved were of such a specialized
nature as to be, by a witness' own admission, outside
the area of his knowledge and familiarity.

Of course,

such was not the case with the myelogram and spinal
decompression laminectomy procedures performed upon
plaintiff by the defendants.
procedure.

Each was a common place

Dr. Lamb said he had performed thousands

of back operations of the type performed upon the
plaintiff.

Brief of Respondent Dr. Thoen at 5-6.

Dr.

Dalrymple, an internist, on questioning by counsel
for Dr. Lamb, stated that he knew that the standard
of care was in orthpedic surgery.
Dr. Lamb at 5; Tr. day 1 at 68-69.

Brief for Respondent
When Dr. Rocovich

testified that he had performed over 1,000 different
myelogramsand over 1,000 spinal decompression laminectomies,
he overcame any objection that defendants could raise
concerning his credentials with respect to either procedure.
Tr. day 3 at 109.
As for Dr. Lamb's assertion that it would be
ludicrous to allow a non-board certified doctor to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testify regarding the standard of care in a board
certified specialty, Dr. Thoen, for one, stated that
the standards for both certified and noncertified
specialists were the same in his field.

Tr. day 3 at 6.

It is hardly ludicrous to allow testimony from a
noncertified specialist in light of such an admission.
Neither is it ludicrous to suggest that a noncertified
specialist or even an internist, for that matter, should
be able to testify as to those things for which he
professes proper knowledge and familiarity.
Finally, it is suggested by Defendant Lamb
that Dr. Rocovich is a "foreign quack," a "charlatan,"
and "nothing more than a professional witness without
either professional qualifications or conscience."
Brief for Respondent Dr. Lamb at 24.

This unfortunate

attack on a fellow professional is a most regrettable
but nevertheless accurate indication of the kind of
vicious collegial pressure that is brought to bear on a
lone· doctor who dares call them as he sees them when he
sees malpractice.

Dr. Rocovich has been a highly

respected and able teacher as well as practitioner of
neurosurgery for more than two decades.

He has headed

neurosurgical departments in two major U.S. hospitals
and has helped to train interns and residents in the verY
fields in which defendants specialize.

He has proven

his expertise in the performance of thousands of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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delicate operations and relieved much pain and suffering
through the exercise of his considerable skills and
abilities.

It was in recognition of the very talents

which defendants claim were lacking, that the trial
court allowed Dr. Rocovich to express his expert
opinion on the causation question.

See Brief for

Respondent Dr. Thoen at 13; Tr. day 4 at 46-47.

Dr.

Lamb's unjustified comments help to demonstrate why
a conspiracy of silence exists among doctors who must
continue to practice in communities where they might
otherwise be called upon to testify.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ATTACK THE NATIONAL STANDARD
TEST WITH INAPPOSITE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
UTAH'S RURAL CHARACTERISTICS EVEN THOUGH
THEY ADMITTED BEING GOVERNED THEMSELVES
BY A NATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE.
Both defendants oppose the adoption in Utah
of a national standard of care.

The chief objections

to the application of such a rule seem to center
around the argument that Utah is a sparsely populated
Western state of essentially rural character whose doctors
are isolated from or too busy to keep up with today's
medical advancements.

Dr. Thoen suggests that the

application of a national standard in Eastern urbanized
states "may be expected" since high levels of skill
and superior facilities are more available there.

Brief
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for Respondent Dr. Thoen at 43.

It is nevertheless

conceded that the states of Arizona, Texas, Washington
and others, whose population distributions are not unlike
Utah's have readily adopted national medical standards of
care.

Brief for Defendant Dr. Thoen at 39-40.
The raising of hypothetical "rural" arguments

against the national standard, is actually inappropriate
in this case.

It is important to note that Defendant Ors.

Lamb and Thoen were practicing specialists with access
to the most modern and advanced equipment available in
several nearby fully accredited hospitals in the largest
and most urban city of a state with a nationally superior
physician population ratio--in many cases double that of
her neighboring states.
at 53.

Brief for Respondent Dr. Thoen

Both of the said defendants admitted being governed

by a national standard in their respective practices.
Brief for Appellant Swan at 44-45; Tr. day 2 at 2, Tr.
day 3 at 5-6, 67.

Such conditions clearly do not indicate

that a national standard would have any oppressive effect
on the defendants.
Dr. Thoen attempts to cause undue concern for
the adoption of a national standard by relating hypotheticai
"horror stories" of small towns losing their doctors a~
of treatment costs skyrocketing.
Dr. Thoen at 26, 47-48.

Brief for Respondent

Dr. Thoen asks rhetorically

whether a town with an inadequately qualified doctor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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woul6

be better off with no doctor at all.
answer could well be yes.

Id.

at 26.

The

If the doctor's lack of

qualifications resulted in his misdiagnosis of classically
diagnosible illnesses, his unnecessary surgery on healthy
tissue, or his prescription of needless or possibly even
harmful medications, a town could easily be better off
without him.

Fortunately, however, such a question need

not be answered since the national standard test would
in no way tend to drive doctors away from small towns.
Dr. Thoen expresses concern that a national
standard would hold the small town baby-delivering
general practitioner to the "level of knowledge" possessed
by a board certified obstetrician.
not the case.

Id. at 57.

Such is

The national standard is a standard of

care, not of knowledge.

The general practitioner treating

a heart patient need not have all the knowledge of a
cardiologist.

But if he attempts open-heart surgery in

other than serious emergency situations, he should be
held to the standard of care for such surgery.
standard is set by specialists, so be it.

If that

If one is

going to "play the game" he had better "know the rules."
Rural general practitioners know this and are not
threatened by it.

They do not perform heart bypass

surgeries or prosthetic joint replacements, nor should
they.

They know when something is beyond their skill or

understanding and frequently rely on specialists for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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consultation as well as for referral of patients
whose problems may go beyond their abilities to treat.
Defendants do not suggest that when the courts
of Massachusetts, Kentucky, Maryland, Wisconsin, Texas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Arizona, New Jersey and Washington
adopted the national standard, the doctors in said states
left their practices, altered their procedures or caused
a state of panic in the populace.

Such things did not

happen there and will not happen in Utah.

It is to be

expected that prior to the adoption of any new rule the
stories concerning its anticipated affects will abound.
The imaginary problems which such stories describe are
characteristically disconcerting but nonetheless unreal.
They should be identified and considered as being the
scare tactics which they are.
POINT V
BY PERMITTING A NON-RESIDENT EXPERT WITNESS
TO TESTIFY FOR A PLAINTIFF IN A MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASE A COURT DOES NOT REDUCE
THE CONSIDERABLE BURDEN OF PROOF WHICH THE
PLAINTIFF HAS.
It should be emphasized that a pronouncement
by this Court of a standard which would permit a properlY
qualified nonresident physician to testify as an expert
for a plaintiff in a Utah medical malpractice case,
would not lessen a plaintiff's burden of proof.

on the

contrary, by allowing plaintiff's nonresident expert
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to testify, the Court only allows plaintiff to survive
a motion to dismiss his action.
a favorable verdict.

It does not give him

A plaintiff generally still must

show by expert testimony that a physician violated a
standard of care set by the medical profession
not the courts or the jury.

itself,

Plaintiff must also show

by expert testimony that the said violation, if any,
was the proximate cause of an injury suffered by him.
Then he must show that his injuries resulted in
compensable damages.

Finally, plaintiff must get_a

jury to believe the evidence that he presents.

Failure

of proof on any element of his case is fatal to his
cause.
As attested by the recent medical malpractice
cases which have survived motions to dismiss in Salt Lake
County, the mere fact that a case reaches the jury does
not mean that the plaintiff will recover damages.

Of eleven

medical malpractice cases in Salt Lake County which
went to the jury between the years 1973 and 1976, eight
of them resulted in jury verdicts of no cause of action.

See

Records on file with the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office.:
Nelson v. Peterson, No. 204648 (3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, July
16, 1973), verdict:

no cause of action; Cahoon v. McKay,

No. 205196 (3d Dist., s.L.Co., Utah. November 12, 1973)
verdict:

no cause of action;

Maxfield v. Cleqg:, No. 206682

(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, June 24, 1974), verdict:

no
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cause of action; Herrera v. Barton, No. 207735 (3d Dist.,
SL.LCo., Utah., August 26, 1974), verdict:

$10,039.82;

Chealez v. St. Mark's Hospital, No. 210376

(3d Dist.,s.

L.Co., Utah, September 12, 1974), verdict: $5,202.00;
Allred v. Davis, No. 208981
November 6, 1974), verdict:
v. Carson, No. 210500
197 4) , verdict:
no. 218595
verdict:

(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah,
no cause of action; Ollerton

(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, November

no cause of action;

11}

Martinez v. Armstronc,

(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, February 26, 1975),
no cause of action; Jones v. Nielsen, No. 22545i

(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, March 8, 1976), verdict:

no

cause of action; Osguthorpe v. Broadbent, No. 212598
(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, May 17, 1976), verdict:

no

cause of action; Richman v. Pemberton, No. 225996 (3d
Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, November 8, 1976), verdict:
$50,000.00.

(Interestingly, in many of the said cases,

the Third District Court allowed testimony from out-ofstate experts.)
Even when a plaintiff's case overcomes a motion
to dismiss, a defendant doctor has the opportunity to
elicit testimony exposing and attacking the biases or
weaknesses of plaintiff's expert, including his credenti~
qualifications and background.

He can pit his testimony

· st
and that of a battery of experts, if he chooses, again
the opinion of what may be the only expert witness which
a plaintiff's meager resources allow him to secure.
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Defendants do not need the additional advantage which
is given them under the terms of a "strict locality
rule."
It is both serious and costly for a person,
even though damaged, to sue a medical professional in
Utah.

A lawsuit cannot, in light of exacting statutory

requirements, be brought first and an investigation
the basis for the claim be conducted later.

of

(See the

rigorous requirements for serving advance notice of
intent to commence malpractice action in §78-14-8, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.)

By the time a case has reached

the trial stage, a plaintiff will have incurred
considerable expense securing his expert witnesses who
must leave busy and demanding practices in order to be
present in court to testify.·

There must be some certainty

as to whether the expert will pass muster before the
court.
In cases such as the present one, where unsettled questions of law were pivotal to the case, the
trial judge could have taken defendant's motion to
dismiss under advisement, submitted the case to the
jury, and, if he felt it necessary, overturned a jury
verdict for the plaintiff by entering a judgment
notwithstanding the verdic~ on grounds of incompetent
expert testimony.

Then, in the event of reversal on

appeal, this Court would only have to reinstate the
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by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute ofto
Museum
and Library the
Services
jury
verdict
without
causing
plaintiff
incur
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

expense of a second trial.
CONCLUSION
As pointed out by Dr. Lamb, the trial judge
has wide discretion in judging the qualifications of
an expert witness.
22-23.

Brief for respondent Dr. Lamb at

However, he must utilize correct principles of

law as criteria for judging credentials of the prof erred
expert.

Failure to do so would constitute a

prejudici~

error and would result in reversal of his decision.

In

the instant case the trial judge applied the strict
locality rule as the standard of care for physicians
and surgeons in Utah.

Since this was not the correct

standard to apply, the judgment in the case should be
reversed with instructions on the proper standard, and
remanded for a new trial
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of
December, 1977.
HANSEN & ORTON

(J)
NSEN
t
Attorney or Plaintiff/Appellan
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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